

Gómez-Muller, A. (2018). "Sartre and Marx", in: Gama, L. ; Paredes, D. ; Parra, A. (Comp.) Dialogues with Marx. Bogotá: National University of Colombia. Pp. 89-106.

It questions the work of Marx in relation to Jean Paul Sartre, based on the reconstruction of a link between existential contingency and political praxis.

It deals with the absurdity of existing and historical materialism; Sartrean criticism of official Marxism; Marx's criticism; the new critical theory and the anarchist perspective.

The relationship between Sartre and Marx is about the problem of the link between two ways of thinking that involve different objects and research objectives, and different theoretical, methodological and conceptual models.

Sartre is a philosopher of freedom, a thinker of the contingency of values and historical situations. Being the result of decisions already taken and inherited, the present situation is simply absurd, since it has no reason to exist. However, this contingency of the real is complemented by a reading of political praxis in Marx. Although the situation is contingent, there are forces, actors and historical dilemmas that force the individual to take a position that has consequences and an ethical sense.

From Sartre, the presupposition of Marxist materialism, namely that everything that exists is irreducible to the material in a quantifiable sense, is nothing more than a metaphysical positivism. But since Marx, the freedom of the individual acquires a value if there is a historical context that does not depend entirely on the individual will. It only makes sense to make decisions and there is only a real gap in the decisions we make if we do not fully control the consequences of our actions, that is, if there is a context that surpasses us.

Sartre reveals himself as a thinker of history, but not from a totalizing and abstract perspective, which always supposes what he is going to analyze, but a thinker of history in singular situations. This approach to history requires Marx, but also to go beyond him, since the singularity of the historical situation can only be thought from the existentialist concept of individual freedom.

With Marx, Sartre finds a way to reconstruct his thinking about contingency. In this reconstruction, contingency is no longer thought of on a purely ontological plane and is acquiring a historical character. With this passage from the ontological to the historical, contingency will lose its radical or absolute character, and in Sartre's latest philosophy it will appear as a particular configuration of the world determined by a culture or anti-culture that articulates a certain type of sociability and relations of production.

Letting go of the illusory absolute point of view means assuming that in historical reality there is meaning and nonsense, value and anti-value, humanity and inhumanity, necessity and contingency. The situation is therefore a history that is not history, a progress that does not advance, a total explanation for what is necessary and total for what is contingent. The problem of history is the problem of thinking about the historical without deleting either aspect.